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Resum.	Oliver Williamson ha argumentat que els mercats i les 
organitzacions jeràrquiques, com les empreses, representen 
estructures alternatives de governança que difereixen en els 
enfocaments per a resoldre els conflictes d’interès. L’inconve­
nient dels mercats és que sovint impliquen el regateig i el desa­
cord. L’inconvenient de les empreses és que l’autoritat, que 
mitiga la contenció, pot abusar­se. Els mercats competitius 
funcionen relativament bé perquè els compradors i els vene­
dors poden recórrer a altres socis comercials en cas de dissi­
dència. Però quan la competència del mercat és limitada, les 
empreses són més adequades per a la resolució de conflictes 
dels mercats. Una predicció clau de la teoria de Williamson, 
que també ha rebut el suport empíricament, és, per tant, que la 
propensió dels agents a realitzar les seves transaccions dins 
les empreses respectives augmenta segons el grau d’especifi­
citat dels béns involucrats en la relació entre les parts contrac­
tants. Elinor Ostrom ha desafiat la creença convencional que la 
propietat comuna està mal gestionada i que ha de ser regulada 
per autoritats centrals o privatitzada. D’acord amb nombrosos 
estudis sobre les poblacions de peixos, pastures, boscos, llacs 
i conques d’aigües subterrànies administrades per usuaris, 
Ostrom conclou que els resultats són, sovint, millors que els 
predits per les teories econòmiques estàndard, a causa que 
els usuaris de recursos desenvolupen freqüentment mecanis­
mes sofisticats per a la presa de decisions i l’aplicació de les 
regles per a manejar els conflictes d’interessos. En la seva 
obra, ha descrit les regles que promouen resultats reeixits. 
Paraules	clau: governança econòmica · economia de les 
organitzacions · economia institucional · economia dels costos 
de transaccions · recursos comuns
Abstract. Oliver Williamson has argued that markets and hier­
archical organizations, such as firms, represent alternative gov­
ernance structures that differ in their approaches to resolving 
conflicts of interest. The drawback of markets is that they often 
entail haggling and disagreement. The drawback of firms is 
that authority, which mitigates contention, can be abused. 
Competitive markets work relatively well because buyers and 
sellers can turn to other trading partners in case of dissent. But 
when market competition is limited, firms are better suited for 
conflict resolution than markets. A key prediction of William­
son’s theory, which has also been supported empirically, is 
therefore that agents’ propensity to carry out their transactions 
within their respective companies rises with the degree of spe­
cificity of the goods involved in the relationship between the 
contracting parties. Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conven­
tional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and 
should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. 
Based on numerous studies of user­managed fish stocks, pas­
tures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom con­
cluded that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than 
those predicted by standard economic theories, as resource 
users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for deci­
sion­making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of inter­
est. In her work, she has described the rules that promote suc­
cessful outcomes.
Keywords:	economic governance · economics of 
organizations · institutional economics · transaction cost 
economics · common­pool resources
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The Swedish Central Bank  (Sveriges Riksbank) Prize  in Eco-
nomics,  established  in  memory  of  Alfred  Nobel,  was  jointly 
awarded in 2009 to Professor Elinor Ostrom (University of Indi-
ana at Bloomington, USA) and Professor Oliver E. Williamson 
(University of California at Berkeley, USA) (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1.  Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson. © The Nobel Founda-
tion. Photos: Ulla Montan. 
This article is divided into three sections:
1)   The first section is devoted to a brief history of the prize 
commonly  known  as  the  ‘Nobel  Prize  in  Economics,’ 
even though it was not originally instituted in Alfred No-
bel’s will.
2)   The second section examines the impact of the financial 
crisis on economic analyses based on what are called 
‘efficient markets.’ The economic and financial crisis that 
broke out on 9 August 2007 has led to a re-thinking of 
many  of  the  economic  ideas  that  have  strongly  influ-
enced society and economic policies since the 1970s.
3)   The third section spotlights the contributions by Oliver E. 
Williamson and Elinor Ostrom, the winners of the Nobel 
Prize in Economics 2009.
The economics prize in memory of Alfred Nobel
Alfred Nobel (1833–1896) was born in Stockholm (Sweden) on 
21 October 1833 into a family with a tradition of technical in-
ventions. His  father,  Immanuel Nobel, was  an  engineer who 
had built bridges and buildings in the capital of Sweden. The 
failure of his businesses drove him to  immigrate to Saint Pe-
tersburg  (Russia), where he made his  fortune manufacturing 
and selling military equipment to the tsar’s army, including the 
underwater mines that protected the Russian capital from the 
threat of the British Royal Navy during the Crimean War (1853–
1856). The family’s wealth made it possible for Alfred Nobel to 
study chemistry in Sweden, Germany, France—where he en-
countered the Italian chemist Antonio Sobrero, the inventor of 
nitroglycerine—and  the  United  States  of  America,  where  he 
met Swedish inventor John Ericsson.
Alfred Nobel returned to Saint Petersburg after completing 
his education, but the end of the war led to a decline in weap-
ons  orders.  He moved  to  Sweden with  his  parents  and  his 
younger brother, Emil. His older brothers, Robert and Ludvig, 
remained in Russia, where they built an emporium based on oil 
from Baku  (Caucasus).  In 1864, a nitroglycerine explosion at 
one of Alfred Nobel’s factories led to the death of his brother, 
Emil, an event that spurred him to develop a more stable explo-
sive: dynamite. After securing his patent in 1867, Alfred Nobel 
created 90 laboratories and companies that supplied dynamite 
for public works projects (tunnels and canals) to more than 20 
countries in Europe, America, and Asia.
Nobel  never married;  he was passionate  about  chemistry 
and physics, as well as literature and poetry. For a time he en-
listed  the  domestic  help  of Bertha Kinsky,  later  the Austrian 
Countess  Von  Suttner,  who  influenced  his  pacifistic  convic-
tions. By the time of his death, in San Remo, Italy, on 10 De-
cember 1896, Nobel had registered 355 patents. His laborato-
ry assistant, Ragnar Sohlman, was charged with executing his 
last will and testament but its terms were rejected by Nobel’s 
family: Alfred Nobel had earmarked his wealth to the establish-
ment of a foundation that would award prizes  in the fields of 
physics, chemistry, medicine or physiology, and literature, and 
for efforts contributing to world peace. Initially, the academies 
and  institutions  charged  with  administering  his  legacy  also 
questioned the wisdom of the prizes. Finally, in 1901, the first 
Nobel Prize awards ceremony was held for the prizes in phys-
ics,  chemistry,  medicine  or  physiology,  and  literature  at  the 
Royal Academy of Music of Stockholm. The Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded  in Kristiania  (currently Oslo, Norway).  In 1968, 
coinciding with the tricentennial of the Swedish Central Bank, 
the Swedish monetary authority instituted ‘The Sveriges Riks-
bank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,’ 
awarded each year by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Swe-
den) following the principles of the Nobel Foundation (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2.  The Medal  for the Sveriges Riksbank Prize  in Economic Sci-
ences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. ®© The Nobel Foundation.
Economic crisis and crisis in the economy
In the 18th century, the analysis of human economic behavior 
fell within the scope of moral philosophy. In the 19th century, 
neoclassical economics  introduced the criteria of maximizing 
utility and benefit through the rational behavior of agents, which 
led to concepts such as market equilibrium. The 1929 stock 
market crash and the ensuing Great Depression cast doubt on 
the flexibility of the neoclassical approach; instead, there was 
broad  acceptance  of  Keynesian  models  of  demand,  which 
guided economic policies based on the Phillips curve aimed at 
achieving sustained growth.
The 1970s, with its so-called stagflation, marginalized all the 
Keynesian prescriptions. The ‘new classics’ appeared on the 
scene.  Robert  Lucas  and  Thomas  Sargent  published  After 
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Keynesian Economics in 1979. The hypothesis of ‘efficient 
markets’ formulated by Eugene Fama took hold, with the claim 
that market prices reflected the fundamental value of goods. 
According to the economic analysis that would eventually pre­
vail, agents’ behavior was founded on the formulation of ra­
tional expectations. The dynamic stochastic general equilibri­
um models were based on the prevalence of a representative 
agent and on the concept of ‘NAIRU’ (non­accelerating infla­
tion rate of unemployment) and Ricardian equivalence. Even 
the new­generation Keynesians included many of these ele­
ments in their models while maintaining the rigidity of salaries 
and prices. Beyond the debates between the ‘new classic’ ad­
vocate Edward Prescott and the ‘neo­Keynesian’ approach of 
Lawrence Summers, a synthesis seemed to emerge in eco­
nomic thinking.
The election of Margaret Thatcher as the British Prime Min­
ister and of Ronald Reagan as the President of the United 
States of America opened up a period of mistrust in state and 
public­policy intervention in society. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
strengthened this historical trend. Ronald Reagan’s appoint­
ment of Alan Greenspan as the Chairman of the Federal Re­
serve deepened the authorities’ trust in private agents and 
markets as able to make decisions rationally by estimating and 
covering the risks involved. The Chairman of the Fed (Federal 
Reserve) spearheaded the so­called Greenspan Put, which 
consisted of letting the markets run themselves, with the guar­
antee of lowering interest rates and rescuing systemic entities 
in the event of a sudden crisis. Alan Greenspan’s mandate was 
renewed throughout the administrations of George H. W. 
Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Moreover, in 1999 
President Clinton repealed the Glass­Steagall Act, rendering it 
possible for large financial groups to assemble, merging the 
operations of commercial and investment banks. The globali­
zation of the economy provided new levers for growth, such as 
the global saving glut, emergent low­cost economies (China, 
etc.), the revolution in information and communication technol­
ogies, and a financial system offering innovative products. As a 
result, the monetary authorities of the central banks limited 
their attention to controlling the inflation rate, essentially ignor­
ing the evolution in the prices of goods (stock market and real 
estate prices).
The 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics awarded Harry M. Mark­ 
owitz, for his portfolio selection model, Merton H. Miller, for his 
financial theories, and William F. Sharpe, for his Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). Market operators drew profusely from 
the risk appraisal methods (value at risk or VaR) recommended 
by these financial models. However, the Nobel Prize in Eco­
nomics has also supported economists who have signaled cau­
tion regarding the limitations of the economic approaches that 
have gained mainstream acceptance. For example, in 1972 the 
prize was awarded to Kenneth Arrow for his contributions to 
moral hazard and adverse selection in the presence of asym­
metric information, and in 1978 to Herbert A. Simon for his 
studies on bounded rationality. In 1988, the Swedish Academy 
awarded the prize to Maurice Allais, who had formulated the 
Allais paradox,’ in 2001, the Nobel Prize honored George Aker­
lof for his famous analysis known as the market for lemons, 
Michael Spence for his studies on signaling, and Joseph Stiglitz 
for his pioneering research into credit markets.
On 9 August 2007, bank activities that had allowed the dis­
tribution of loans securitized in structured financial products 
began to collapse around the world. The underlying financial 
models, which had been among the most keenly studied at 
universities and business school, had failed. The financial and 
economic crisis necessitated a reconsideration of the prevail­
ing paradigm. The Behavioral Economics School approach 
posited by the 2002 Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman and 
Vernon Smith had been vindicated, and Charles Kindleberger’s 
studies on ‘Manias, Panics, and Crashes’ (1978) was consid­
ered anew. As Hyman Minsky had cautioned during the previ­
ous decades, economic agents were characterized by irrational 
behavior, excess trust, and waves of optimism and pessimism 
that fed speculative bubbles. Keynes’s ‘animal spirits’ were 
back. The economic and financial crisis has shaken up the 
dominant economic thinking in historical dimensions, as was 
reflected in the choice of the 2009 Nobel Prize winners.
Brief	biography	of	Oliver	E.	Williamson
Oliver E. Williamson (Superior, Wisconsin, 1932) is an Emeritus 
Professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of 
California at Berkeley (USA) and the editor of the Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization. His university education 
began at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Later, he 
earned an MBA from Stanford University and a PhD in Eco­
nomics from Carnegie­Mellon University.
Williamson uses an informal methodology based on Herbert 
Simon’s (1978 Nobel Prize) contributions on bounded rational­
ity as explained in his study entitled ‘A Behavioral Model of Ra­
tional Choice,’ published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics 
in 1955 (Fig. 5). Williamson’s most important contributions 
have revolved around the resolution of organizational and con­
tractual conflicts, as well as the implementation of agreements, 
thus laying the groundwork for what is referred to as institu­
tional economics and the economics of organization.
Ronald	Coase’s	groundwork. Conventional economic anal­
ysis posits that contracts are complete, and compliance with 
them is guaranteed by the legal system. It also reduces a com­
pany to a black box, with a productive function that transforms 
productive factors, or inputs, into goods and services, or out­
puts. Jacob Viner’s contributions to the concepts of econo­
mies of scale and scope were developed within this framework. 
This approach to the company was extended to the ‘structure­
behavior­results paradigm,’ in which the goal of maximizing 
profit leads companies to raise the production level to the point 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Ronald H. Coase (1991 Nobel Prize) thoroughly questioned 
this state of affairs in his 1937 publication The Nature of the 
Firm. Coase defined the concept of ‘transaction cost,’ which 
includes the cost of gathering information, costs involved in ne­
gotiating, costs related to guarantees, costs inherent in admin­
istration, costs derived from conflict resolution, and costs that 
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arise in implementing agreements. Coase questioned the busi­
ness decision to manufacture within the organization as an al­
ternative to purchasing from third parties on the market. This 
choice must be based on efficiency criteria in order to minimize 
the transaction costs. The dichotomy of ‘manufacture vs. buy’ 
leads to the more transcendental dichotomy of ‘firm vs. mar­
ket,’ in which the two are alternative governing structures for 
resolving the conflict of resource allocation. The organizational 
consequences of this response are quite divergent and of high 
impact, since the option of resolving the conflict within the 
company subjects the allocation of resources to the hierarchi­
cal authority of the executive, while resolving it through out­
sourcing in the market requires negotiated contracts to be 
signed with suppliers. In short, the alternative solutions are as 
at odds with each other, as was the visible hand of Alfred D. 
Chandler compared to the invisible one of Adam Smith.
The	limits	of	the	firm. Oliver E. Williamson contributed funda­
mental research into positive economics, specifically, regard­
ing the organizational limits of the firm and the regulatory impli­
cations of vertical integration, in his article ‘Vertical Integration 
of Production: Market Failure Considerations,’ published in 
1971 in the American Economic Review. These ideas were fur­
ther developed in his 1975 book Markets and Hierarchies. Wil­
liamson’s analysis of the limits of the firm was grounded on 
Coase’s concept of ‘transaction cost,’ as applied to the exam­
ple of the coal mine supplying an electricity­generating plant. 
This example originated in the Paul Joskow article entitled ‘Ver­
tical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal­
Burning Electric Generating Plants,’ published in 1985 in The 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. According to 
Williamson, the relationship between the coal mine and the 
electricity­generating plant can be established in several ways:
•  An incomplete contract via market exchange
•  A complete contract that specifies the details of the sup­
plier­client relationship via market exchange and all fore­
seeable contingencies
•  The integration of both activities, coal mining and elec­
tricity generation, into a single company
The efficiency criterion that minimizes the transaction costs 
in order to determine whether to maintain the relationship via 
market exchange (incomplete or complete contract) or to per­
form the job within the company, through vertical integration, 
depends on factors such as:
•  The degree of mutual dependency among the activities 
(proximity, etc.)
•  The complexity of the relationship, particularly regarding 
uncertainty
•  The specificity of the physical and human activities in­
volved in the relationship
Williamson pays particular attention to the possible oppor­
tunistic behavior that could arise if the relationship is character­
ized by a high degree of dependence, the complexity is high, 
and the specificity of the physical and human assets is consid­
erable. In this case, the solution to the conflict will encourage 
the vertical integration of the coal mine and the electricity­gen­
erating plant into a single company characterized by resources 
allocated within a single hierarchical decision­making structure.
William’s contributions to positive economics regarding the 
efficient organizational limits of the firm endorse business con­
centration through vertical integration, in this case. However, 
this conclusion was in conflict with the antitrust principles and 
legislation in the United States, which back in the 1960s restrict­
ed the formation of companies with a market power higher than 
the maximums stipulated by the Lerner Index or the Hirschman­
Herfindhal Index. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, antitrust 
laws in the United States evolved, influenced in part by William­
son’s studies. Specifically, the Merger Guidelines (1984) sig­
naled a radical shift in antitrust principles, which now allowed 
vertical integration that brought greater efficiency, even if it 
meant a concentration of market share in the integrated com­
pany. The problem to be considered by the regulations and 
courts that defended competition, as Williamson had stated, 
was not the amount of market share attained but the poten­
tially monopolistic behavior of the company resulting from the 
vertical integration process.
The	economic	institutions	of	capitalism. Oliver E. William­
son made a seminal contribution to institutional economic anal­
ysis in his book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, 
Markets, Relational Contracting (1985). This epic study de­
scribes the institutions that make up the economic and social 
system of capitalism, dividing them into two levels:
1)  The set of rules (legal, social, political, etc.) that govern 
human interactions in order to facilitate production and 
exchange.
2)  The mechanisms to protect property rights
In later contributions, Williamson further examined this topic 
while opening up new avenues of inquiry for other researchers 
in the field of contractual relationships, namely, with respect to 
informational asymmetry, inefficient negotiations, and the sub­
stitutive reputation mechanisms of contracts (Kreps, 1990). 
Likewise, Williamson (1980) also made major contributions in 
the field of corporate finances, stating that companies with 
specific assets can be financed by shareholders who exercise 
control over management and pursue profits in the form of div­
idends. However, companies with standardized assets can be 
financed by issuing corporate bonds, since bondholders are 
interested in profitability from fixed­income securities and only 
have rights over the assets if the company becomes involved in 
a liquidation process. 
Brief	biography	of	Elinor	Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom (Los Angeles, California, 1933) earned her PhD 
from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1965 with a 
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dissertation on salt water that filtered down into the potable 
groundwater in the Los Angeles (California) metropolitan area. 
Today, she is Professor of Political Science at the School of 
Public and Environmental Affairs at the University of Indiana at 
Bloomington (USA). She also founded and directs the Center 
for the Study of Institutional Diversity, at Arizona State Univer­
sity in Tempe (USA).
Ostrom has grounded a portion of her research upon an 
inductive methodology based on analyses of case studies and 
laboratory experiments with psychologists, an approach that 
some have questioned. She has also examined the strategic 
interaction of users of common property, through game theo­
ry’s prisoner’s dilemma, in repeated non­cooperative games 
designed according to the studies of Robert Aumann (2005 
Nobel Prize). Therefore, the 2009 Nobel Prize awarded to 
Elinor Ostrom rekindled the controversy noted by Axel Leijon­
hufvud on the barriers to entering the profession of econom­
ics.
The	‘tragedy	of	common	property’
The concept of ‘common property’ encompasses, among oth­
er things, pastures, forests, lakes, groundwater basins, irriga­
tion water for plants, the sea, fish stocks, and the air. The na­
ture of common property is characterized by two features, 
namely, free access to its use and consumption, and the fact 
that property rights are undefined. The consumption of com­
mon property lowers its availability for other users, so the ben­
efit is individual while the cost is shared. This means that the 
users or consumers reach the point where their marginal ben­
efit equals the marginal cost of the last user or consumer. This 
perverse incentive for users of common property will lead to 
the overexploitation of these resources, as posited in the pio­
neering work by H.S. Gordon entitled ‘The Economic Theory of 
a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,’ published in the 
Journal of Political Economy in 1954. Later, the biologist Garret 
Hardin coined the expression ‘The Tragedy of the Commons,’ 
as he titled an article that appeared in the journal Science in 
1968.
Conventional economic analysis offers two solutions to re­
solve the ‘tragedy’ of the depletion of common property as a 
result of the overexploitation of resources. The first is privatiza­
tion. However, this alternative introduces the problem of defin­
ing appropriation rights to the sea or to groundwater. The sec­
ond solution proposes converting common property into public 
property based on a nationalization process. On this point, 
A.C. Pigou noted, in The Economics of Welfare (1920) that one 
option is to establish a general or usage tax to regulate access 
to and sustainable preservation of common property. Alterna­
tively, a user or capture fee can be instated. Ronald H. Coase 
questioned Pigou’s solution in his important article, ‘The Prob­
lem of Social Cost,’ published in the Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics in 1960. Coase noted that if a tax or access fee to the 
common property is to be set, it should be freely negotiated by 
the parties involved. However, this assertion is only appropriate 
if the transaction costs are zero.
The	‘governing’	of	common	property	by	its	
beneficiaries
In her book Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institu-
tions for Collective Action, Elinor Ostrom suggests that the use 
of common property is not necessarily vulnerable to the tragedy 
of depletion due to overexploitation; rather, users can cooper­
ate through sophisticated processes of sustainably managing 
common property. The case studies analyzed by Ostrom’s re­
search include pastures in Mongolia, China, and Russia. As 
confirmed by the satellite photographs taken of these pastures, 
properties collectivized under communist China did not gener­
ate the proper incentives for their preservation (Fig. 3); nor did 
the privatization embarked upon by rural Chinese communes 
starting in the 1980s improve the situation. This non­sustaina­
bility of the pastures was also the case in the public property 
systems of Siberian pastures in the Soviet Union. By contrast, 
Ostrom noted that nomadic livestock farmers in Mongolia have 
managed their pastures following an ancestral process of coop­
eration that has enabled them to feed their herds for centuries.
Another case analyzed by Ostrom was the use of reservoir 
water to irrigate farmland in Nepal. Traditionally, the water in 
the rivers was held back with reservoirs built of stones, mud, 
and lumber. The frailness of these structures required irrigators 
to work together to repair and maintain them, for which they 
were rewarded with access to the water to irrigate their farm­
lands. International aid and the Nepalese government built res­
ervoirs made of cement and steel, which eliminated the need 
for maintenance. As a result, irrigators upriver began to collect 
the water, harming the downriver farmers. Destroying the in­
centive to cooperate in maintaining the reservoir jeopardized 
the sustainable use of the irrigation water.
Based on her research, Ostrom formulated the principles for 
successfully managing common property, stating that they are 
more readily implemented if the groups of beneficiaries are small 
and the interactions among members are repeated over time:
1)  Clear rules by which the beneficiaries of common­pool 
resources can decide on the different issues that arise 
regarding access to and use of these resources
Fig.	3.	 Satellite photograph of pastures (in Mongolia, China, and Rus­
sia), a case analyzed in depth by Ostrom, reveal that traditionally man­
aged land areas maintained a better condition and gave greater yields. 
091-214 Contributions 7-2.indd   145 19/06/12   8:52
146  Contrib. Sci. 7 (2), 2011 Mena 
2)  Conflict­resolution mechanisms
3)  Aligning the responsibility for maintaining the common 
property with the benefits yielded by the users
4)  Ensuring that the processes of monitoring, controlling use, 
and applying sanctions are the responsibility of the users 
themselves, not those of an independent third party, con­
trary to the prevailing notion in which monitoring and the 
authority to sanction were assigned to an impartial exter­
nal organization. This point seems to contradict the fact 
that the control cost is incurred privately, while the benefi­
ciaries of monitoring are the group of users. Ostrom ex­
plains the proper working of this mechanism based on the 
role played by reciprocity among the users, the satisfac­
tion of the group to sanction the non­complier, and the 
fear of the potential non­complier of public disapproval. 
Likewise, monitoring the use of common goods is easier if 
there is a calendar for restrictions, such as seasonal bans 
on hunting or fishing. The alternative of setting restrictions 
on amounts raises the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
the corresponding sanctions for non­compliers.
5)  Gradualness in the sanctions, from the first case of non­
compliance to successive recidivism
6)  Democratic decision­making processes, which require 
small groups at the start whose size can gradually in­
crease
7)  Recognition by the public authorities of the system of 
rules and cooperation established by the users of the 
common property
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